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Aspirant Candidate Behaviour and Progressive Political Ambition 
 
In many significant ways politicians do not resemble the overall populations from which they are 
drawn. Thanks to existing research, we know, for example, that politicians are more likely to be 
male (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Lawless and Fox 2010), white, wealthy, highly-educated, and 
to have held certain professional occupations than the average member of society (Carnes 2013). 
One explanation for these patterns is that political elites are more likely to encourage the kinds of 
candidates they want to see running for office to do so (Broockman 2014). This idea of recruitment, 
or mobilization, has also been put forward as a possible remedy for these varying kinds of political 
unrepresentativeness, working on the evidence-based assumption that an effective method of getting 
individuals from traditionally under-represented groups to run for political office at any level is 
simply to ask them to do so (Moncrief et al. 2001; Lawless and Fox 2010; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 
2013; Lawless 2012). David Broockman writes, ‘having been asked to run [is] the modal 
explanation for candidacy or the factor most positively associated with interest in running’ (2014, 
p.109). Evidence on whether this effect holds in the case of progressive political ambition, where 
incumbent legislators consider whether to run for higher office, is mixed, with previous research 
highlighting the added importance of strategic and electoral concerns relating to the political 
opportunity structure facing a prospective candidate in line with classic rational choice approaches 
(Schlesinger 1966; Maestas et al. 2006). 
 
However, existing work is less clear on the effect that the behaviour of aspirant candidates 
themselves has on progressive political ambition relative to being recruited; the possibility that the 
behaviour of aspirant candidates might itself be correlated with both being recruited in the first 
instance, and correlated with that appeal consequently being successful and resulting in the 
individual running for higher office. Although this can be explored through the use of experimental 
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approaches (Broockman 2014; Preece and Stoddard 2015; Preece et al. 2015), data collected from 
incumbent legislators on their progressive ambition is often observational. Here, we use 
observational data to explore how recruitment appeals affect the political ambition of incumbent 
sub-national legislators, specifically asking whether recruitment effects hold having controlled for 
the behaviour of aspirant candidates themselves. Breaking down the process of running for higher 
office, we find that signalling behaviour by the prospective candidate increases the likelihood of 
them entering the selection process for higher office, but does not affect the likelihood of them 
being successful in this endeavour. We conclude, like other recent research in this area, that targeted 
elite recruitment alone might not be enough to increase the diversity of the candidate pool for 
national political office (Preece et al. 2015). Why does this identification of the importance of 
candidate signaling matter? Practically, it means that the efforts of political parties to reverse the 
under-representation of certain groups might be less effective than is currently thought: recruitment 
appeals might simply be tapping in to already-existing well of political ambition that was generated 
independently of them. Theoretically, it follows that academic research on political ambition might 
also be looking at the question of why some are more ambitious than others in the wrong way – 
instead of focusing solely on issues of structure and recruitment, a greater focus on underlying 
psychological dispositions and the role of discriminatory politico-social networks might be called 
for. 
 
Data and Methods 
Our data comprises original data collected via an online survey available between February and 
May 2014 from incumbent local legislators (termed local councillors in the UK) in London, United 
Kingdom.i Data was collected ahead of the May 2014 London local elections at which all electoral 
wards would be contested. A personalized link to the survey was emailed to 1804 legislators from 
32 different London councils at the email address on their official webpages. We received 420 
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responses and 395 were complete, a valid response rate of 22 %.  
 
London is a useful case to focus on when exploring progressive ambition. Local legislators in 
London differ from their colleagues in the rest of the UK: they are younger, more likely to be 
women, less likely to be white, and less likely to be retired (and thus more likely to hold additional 
occupations) (Kettlewell and Phillips 2014). Additionally, London is the political centre of the 
United Kingdom. Proximity to the UK Parliament at Westminster will afford local legislators 
greater proximity to national party organisations based in the city as well as opportunities to work in 
national-level political-focused occupations. Our sample is representative of London legislators as a 
whole in terms of party, sex, and ethnicity (Kettlewell and Phillips 2014). Although, as with all case 
studies, our results may not generalize to sub-national legislators everywhere, we expect there to be 
a substantial number of individuals in our sample who are progressively ambitious in some way, 
increasing our ability to explore the underlying phenomenon in question.  
 
Our measure of political ambition comprises four categories that account for whether a legislator 
has expressed no interest in running for higher office, has considered running for office but has not 
acted on it, or has actually acted on their intention by either entering a candidate selection process 
or standing as a parliamentary candidate. 42 % of respondents had not considered running for 
higher office, whilst 30 % had expressed an intention to run and considered higher office, and a 
further 28 % had taken some action towards actually doing so.ii  
 
Our variable of interest seeks to distinguish individuals who were solely recruited by political actors 
from those who signalled their ambition by approaching a political actor regarding their running for 
higher office, and from those who both approached and were recruited. We compare these 
categories against the reference category who were neither recruited nor signallers. We control for a 
range of demographic variables, including sex, age, ethnicity, marital and parental status, and 
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personality traits as measured on the Big Five scale (Lawless and Fox 2010; Dietrich et al. 2012). 
We also control for the political socialization of prospective candidates, including their family 
backgrounds and early-life engagement with politics (Lawless 2012) as well as non-legislative 
political experience, for example as Congressional staffers or in other ‘instrumental’ political 
occupations (Hernsson 1994).iii Full details of survey items, and more information on the sample, 
are available in the Appendix. 
 
Model Results: Progressive Ambition among Incumbent Local Legislators 
How important to the expression of political ambition is being recruited by a political actor? Does 
the signaling of ambition by the prospective candidate through approaching political actors matter 
more? Or are those individuals who are both signallers and recruited more likely to display 
progressive ambition? To address these questions, we first use a binomial logistic regression model 
to contrast those who are actively seeking office against those who have not taken active steps to 
stand (see Table 2). Model 1 includes only the recruited and signaller categorical variable: those 
recruited only; signallers only; and both recruited and signalled are examined against the base 
category neither recruited nor signalled. Model 2 explores whether these effects hold after 
controlling for established predictors of political ambition and other social baseline indicators. 
Second, we use a multinomial logistic regression to examine progressive ambition in more depth, 
contrasting those incumbent local legislators who have either entered the selection process, have 
actually stood for parliamentary office or who have no intention of standing against those 
individuals who have considered standing but not acted on it (see Table 3). We follow the same 
format as in Table 2, with Model 1 focusing only on recruitment and approaching political actors 
and Model 2 examining whether such effects hold once other covariates are included. All model fit 
statistics operate in the expected direction with reductions in the log-likelihood and the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) evident from Model 1 to Model 2.  
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Before the models, Table 1 provides a descriptive comparison of respondents falling across the four 
categories of progressive ambition. Confirming existing findings, there is a negative relationship 
between being female and progressive ambition. Of those who entered a selection process, less than 
35% were women, declining to just over 25% of those who stood for election. More than 20% of 
non-white legislators had entered the selection process, but of those who stood for election, less 
than 8% were non-white compared to 12% in the overall sample. There is some evidence to suggest 
that individuals who had been employed in instrumental occupations were more likely to have 
entered the selection process or stood as a parliamentary candidate. Similarly, there is also evidence 
that individuals who exhibit emotional stability, and whose parents were heavily politically 
involved, are more likely to have stood in an election.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
More than 60% of those who had not considered standing were neither recruited nor signallers and 
just under a third were solely recruited by political actors. More than 20% of those who had entered 
the selection process were individuals who signalled their ambition by approaching a relevant 
political actor while more than 60% had both approached and been recruited. A similar number of 
those who actually stood as a candidate had both signalled to, and been recruited by, a political 
actor.iv  
 
Based on existing findings in this area, we might expect sex to have a notable influence on levels of 
progressive ambition, and on the interplay of elite recruitment and decision-making. Of those who 
had been recruited by political actors, just under half were women. Less than 40% of individuals 
who had both signalled and been recruited were women, compared to just over 25% of those who 
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signalled their ambition by approaching a relevant political actor. Around a fifth of the 40% of 
women who had both signalled and been recruited had stood as a parliamentary candidate. Our data 
suggests that more women were recruited by political actors than men, and that a slightly higher 
percentage of men signalled their ambition by approaching a political actor than women. Whilst this 
is not entirely conclusive, there seems to be some circumstantial evidence that women are recruited 
more than men, perhaps reflecting recent party efforts to increase women’s representation in 
legislatures. However, this does not seem equally true of ethnicity. Notwithstanding the caveat of 
relatively low numbers, just over 22% of those who signalled their ambition were non-white 
compared to 11.2% who were recruited. A similar number were both recruited and had signalled 
their ambition. Comparing non-whites and whites, only 9% of whites signalled their ambition 
compared to around 19% of non-whites, while slightly more whites were recruited by political 
actors than non-whites. Relative to their overall presence in the sample, it seems reasonably clear 
that more minority ethnic than majority ethnic local legislators are signallers, something that should 
be explored in future research. 
 
The findings in Model 1, Table 2 suggest that those who signalled their ambition and those who 
were both recruited and signallers were significantly more likely to actively seek to stand for public 
office when compared against the base category not approached nor recruited. Signallers were 9.7 
times more likely to actively seek to stand whereas those who were both signallers and recruited 
were nearly 13 times more likely. Yet there was no similar effect for those who were just recruited 
by political actors alone. Those individuals were not significantly more likely to actively seek to 
stand than those who were neither signallers nor recruited. Do these results hold when other 
established indicators of political ambition are taken in account? We present the full results in 
Model 2. Holding all variables constant, signallers were 10 times more likely to actively seek to 
stand. However, individuals who were both recruited and also signallers increased their odds of 
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actively seeking to run by a magnitude of 13.6. To ease interpretation, we estimate the discrete 
change on the probability for each of the values averaged across the observed values.v These 
average marginal effects (AMEs) are graphically illustrated in Figure 1. We calculate the baseline 
probability of actively seeking office if all independent variables are set on their empirical mean. 
The predicted probability equals 1.9 percentage points.  This helps us to evaluate the impact of each 
of the indicators because we can compare the respective effect to the baseline probability. On 
average, the probability of signallers actively seeking to stand is 30% higher than the reference 
category which is being neither a signaller nor recruited by political actors. Being both a signaller 
and being recruited had a slightly larger effect. On average, such individuals were 34% more likely 
to stand. Recruitment was therefore effective where an individual had also signalled their interest in 
running for higher office to political actors. Recruitment alone did not have a significant influence 
on individuals actively seeking to stand (compared to those who were neither signallers nor 
recruited). Of the remaining predictors, well-established drivers of progressive ambition were 
significant. There is also evidence of a sex effect, with the odds of women actively seeking higher 
office being 2.8 times smaller than those of men, a statistically significant difference. On average, 
the probability of women actively standing for public office is fourteen percentage points lower 
than it is for men. Finally, those aged under 40 are on average sixteen percentage points less likely 
to stand than those aged between 40 and 59.   
 
Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 here 
 
When does signalling or being recruited actually matter? Are they key drivers of whether an 
individual actually acts on their consideration to stand for public office by entering the selection 
process? And when compared against those who have not taken active steps, are they the major 
drivers among those legislators who have actually stood for parliamentary office? We address these 
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questions using a multinomial logistical regression where considering to stand is the reference 
category. As before, we use the same format and predictor variables with the key findings presented 
in Table 3 (full model results are in Appendix Table A1). Once again, an aspirant candidate 
signalling their interest in running appears to have a greater effect than being recruited (see Model 
1). But crucially, the signalling effect is only present for entering the selection process, not for 
actually standing for higher office. Similar effects are found for those who have both signalled to, 
and been recruited by, political actors. These results are robust to the addition of further predictor 
variables. Compared to those who have not acted but are considering standing, legislators are 6.8 
times more likely to enter a selection process if they have signalled their interest in running to a 
political actor and around 8 times more likely if they have both signalled and been recruited. Those 
that have solely been recruited are no more likely to have either entered a selection process or 
actually stood for higher office than those who have experienced neither.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
We again examine the average marginal effects to fully assess the impact of these variables (see 
Figure 2 and Table A2 in the Appendix).vi On average, the probability that legislators who had 
signalled their interest to political actors had entered the selection process to stand for higher office 
increases by 21 percentage points. The probability that those who had both signalled and been 
recruited entering the selection process increases by 25 percentage points.  
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
Of the remaining predictors, legislators with a degree were 3.2 times more likely to enter the 
selection process (compared to the base category). The most important driver among those who 
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actually had stood for higher public office, holding all other variables constant, was being male. The 
probability of having stood for higher office is on average 11 percentage points lower for women 
than men. Other variables, including early-life political exposure and socialization, are insignificant. 
This suggests that although they may not explain progressive ambition, they might have a more 
pronounced effect on the decision to seek public office in the first instance. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper explores the effect of aspirant candidate behaviour on progressive political ambition. We 
find that signalling their ambition by approaching a political actor to discuss running for higher 
office has a significant effect the likelihood that an aspirant candidate will act on considerations to 
stand for higher office. Recruitment by a political actor only has a significant effect in combination 
with such signalling. In conjunction with signalling, being recruited certainly matters, but the 
signalling of ambition to a political actor by the aspirant candidate is the key driver, something that 
needs to be explored better in future research in order to identify in detail who the people more 
likely to undertake signalling behaviour are, why this is the case, and what the mechanism in play 
here actually is. For example, building on Broockman’s notion of selective recruitment, self-
instigated approaches might be a reaction to not being recruited, a pro-active attempt by an aspirant 
candidate to put themselves on the radar of recruiters. In such a case, signalling interest to a 
political actor might act as social proof of dedication or could be seen as indicative of the 
possession of inherent traits that might be considered relevant to a successful candidacy. For those 
individuals who feel they are not ingratiated into the relevant social networks, something perhaps 
correlated with membership of traditionally under-represented social groups, signalling might be 
especially important. Alternatively, it might simply be that certain patterns of socialization and/or 
personality traits are present in individuals who approach political actors. These are just some of the 
aspects of aspirant candidate behaviour that could be examined in future research. Such research 
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would have important real-world implications: it is generally accepted that an effective way for 
political parties to increase the number of candidates from traditionally under-represented groups is 
to go out and recruit them. Our findings here show that this might not be as simple a relationship as 
first thought. 
 
Our study has limitations. It is possible that those aspirant candidates who undertook signalling 
behaviour did so because they fully expect to get a positive response. Conversely, it might be that 
those who were instead recruited were particular types of local legislators who were seen to require 
a lot of persuasion as it was perceived that would not be interested in running without it. As such, 
recruitment by political actors might have been used here to persuade them and thus didn’t have 
much success given their underlying negativity to stand. The data we analyse in this paper does not 
permit us to explore these ideas, but future research should consider them. Additionally, it might be 
the case that recruitment functions in a different way for progressive ambition than any initial run 
for office, something that we cannot test here. Finally, owing to our case study approach, it is 
possible that our findings may be particular to the case of London or the UK, which has a stronger 
party system than the United States, the location of much existing research in this area. 
Interrogating the role of aspirant candidate behaviour in different political contexts would greatly 
develop understanding on this point. Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings should 
encourage scholars and practitioners alike to question how the process of candidate mobilization 
appears to function. 
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Endnotes 
                                                            
i It is well-established that sub-national legislative offices provide a pool of eligible candidates to 
run for higher office (Moncrief et al. 2001; Lawless and Fox 2010; Allen 2013). In the United 
Kingdom research has found that around a third of all Members of Parliament (MPs) elected since 
1945 have had experience in a local legislature prior to their election to the House of Commons 
(LGA 2008). 
ii Full details of the dependent variable are in the Appendix. This distinction is based on the 
response category ‘Have entered a selection process or otherwise made efforts to run for 
parliamentary candidacy’. We might expect this to encompass putting one’s name forward for a 
selection process, entering such a process, contesting such a process if shortlisted, and so in. 
Critically, undertaking such activities shows not only intent but also a related action towards the 
goal of holding higher office. 
iii Of course, based on classic contributions to this research area, we might also expect aspirant 
candidates to adjust their activities in accordance with the political opportunity structure in front of 
them, namely whether they resided in or close to a district with an open seat or not (Maestas et al. 
2006). Although this might seem pertinent, we do not account for this in our analysis for various 
reasons. Primarily, the UK has a tradition of candidates travelling to contest constituencies that may 
be far from their current place of residence or where they sit on a local council. In addition, it is 
common for candidates to ‘blood’ themselves in seats considered unwinnable for their party as a 
demonstration of partisan loyalty. As such, it is not clear how we would tie individual legislators to 
given open or closed districts, especially given the intimate proximity of the 73 constituencies in the 
Greater London area. 
iv For brevity, the percentages of the progressive ambition categories within each category of 
signaling and recruiting are as follows. For those Recruited only, 61.8% did not consider standing; 
27% considered standing; 6.7% entered the selection process and 4.5% stood for parliamentary 
election. Of those who signalled their ambition, 15% did not consider standing; 37.5% considered 
standing; 30% entered the selection process and 17.5% stood for parliament. For those who were 
both signalled and recruited, the figures were 4% not considered standing; 41.6% considered 
standing; 29.6% entered the selection process and 24.8% stood as a parliamentary candidate.  
v A marginal effect measures the effect on the conditional mean of y of a change in one of the 
regressors. In a linear model, the marginal effect equals the slope coefficient but in nonlinear 
models, this is not the case. This has led to a number of methods for calculating marginal effects. 
Here we use average marginal effects (AMEs). To get the AME, the marginal effect is first 
calculated for each individual with their observed levels of covariates. These values are then 
averaged across all individuals. 
vi The baseline probabilities when all independent variables are set at their empirical mean are as 
follows: Not considered standing 36 percentage points; Considered standing 44 percentage points; 
Entered selection process 10 percentage points; and Stood for Parliamentary election 11 percentage 
points. 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Socio-economic, socialisation, barriers to running, personality traits etc. 
characteristics of Progressive Ambition (percentages) 
	
Variables Not 
Considered 
Standing 
Considered 
Standing 
Entered 
Selection 
Process 
Stood for 
Election 
Overall 
Sample 
Socio-Economic      
Female 51.2 35.6 34.5 25.5 40.8 
Married 56.5 55.1 60.3 64.7 57.7 
Age Under 40 7.7 28.8 13.8 15.7 15.9 
Age 40-59 28.0 38.1 55.2 51.0 38.0 
Age 60 plus 56.0 28.8 27.6 27.5 40.0 
Missing Age 8.3 4.2 3.4 5.9 6.1 
Non-White 11.3 11.0 20.7 7.8 12.2 
Degree 62.5 77.1 89.7 88.2 74.2 
Live Alone 40.5 36.4 27.6 29.4 35.9 
Cllr responsible  
for Household tasks 
11.9 14.4 19.0 17.6 14.4 
Spouse responsible  for 
Household tasks 
21.4 22.0 39.7 21.6 24.3 
Even responsibility  
for Household tasks 
26.2 27.1 13.8 31.4 25.3 
Children Dependent Age 11.3 21.2 27.6 29.4 19.0 
Socialisation      
Talked Politics 63.7 69.5 75.9 68.6 67.8 
Grew Up in London 44.0 50.0 41.4 35.3 44.3 
Parent & Family  
involved in Politics 
     
Party Member Only 23.8 16.9 29.3 19.6 22.0 
Elected Office Only 7.7 6.8 5.2 5.9 6.8 
Both Member & Elected 7.7 14.4 10.3 17.6 11.4 
Barriers Running For  
Office (not bothered) 
     
Spending less time  
with family/friends 
53.6 35.6 46.6 52.9 47.1 
Privacy/Media Intrusion 48.8 39.8 51.7 52.9 47.1 
Personal Interests 57.1 47.5 55.2 68.6 55.4 
Negative Impact on  
Occupational Goals 
63.1 66.9 70.7 72.5 66.6 
Occupational Experience      
Instrumental Occupation 11.9 18.6 25.9 27.5 18.0 
Signalled/Recruited by  
Political Actors 
     
Not Approached/Recruited 60.7 22.9 5.2 17.6 35.7 
Recruited by Political  
Actors Only 
32.7 20.3 10.3 7.8 22.5 
Signalled to Political  3.6 12.7 20.7 13.7 10.1 
Actors Only 
Both Signalled & Recruited 3.0 44.1 63.8 60.8 31.6 
Personality Traits (SA)      
Open-Minded 29.2 34.7 43.1 37.3 33.9 
Conscientious 19.6 13.6 27.6 11.8 18.0 
Extraverted 16.7 19.5 27.6 21.6 19.7 
Agreeable 23.2 23.7 31.0 19.6 24.1 
Emotionally Stable 30.4 2.9 31.0 37.3 29.1 
N 168 118 58 51 395 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table 2: Logistic Model of Progressive Ambition of Sitting Councillors: Actively 
Seeking to Stand versus Not Standing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables	 Model 1 	
  β        SE	
Model 2	
 β       SE	
Constant	  -2.37*   0.40	  -4.60*  1.29	
Signalled/Recruited by Political 
Actors: Base = Neither	
  
Recruited by Political Actors Only	  0.31     0.45	   0.22    0.47	
Signalled to Political Actors Only	  2.27*   0.44	   2.30*  0.52	
Both Signalled & Recruited	  2.55*   0.35	   2.61*  0.41	
Socio-Economic Variables	   
Female	 -	  -1.03*  0.37	
Degree	 -	   1.39*  0.42	
Non-White	 -	   0.48    0.48	
Age: Base = Age 40-59	   
Age Under 40	 -	  -1.19*  0.42	
Age 60 plus	 -	  -0.19    0.36	
Missing Age	 -	   0.26    0.78	
Family Structures/Roles	   
Married	 -	  -0.10    0.47	
Dependent Children	 -	   0.17    0.29	
Responsibility for Household Tasks: 
Base = Councillor	
  
Spouse Responsible for a majority	 -	   0.80    0.52	
Evenly Responsible for a majority 	 -	  -0.02    0.43	
Live Alone	 -	  -0.04    0.54	
Personality Traits	   
Open-Minded	 -	  -0.04    0.22	
Conscientious	 -	   0.14    0.14	
Extraverted	 -	  -0.10    0.14	
Agreeable	 -	  -0.20    0.21	
Emotionally Stable	 -	   0.43*  0.19	
Political Socialisation	   
Talk Politics at Home	 -	   0.24    0.34	
Parent/Family involved in Politics: 
Base = Not Involved	
  
Parent/Family Party Member Only	    0.05    0.36	
Parent/Family Elected Office Only	 -	  -0.04    0.70	
Parent/Family Both Member & Elected	 -	   0.09    0.51	
Socialisation by Place	   
Grew up in London	 -	  -0.04    0.31	
Barriers to Running For Office: Base 
= Negative Perception	
  
Spending less time with family/friends	 -	  -0.02    0.35	
Loss of Privacy/Media Intrusion	 -	   0.29    0.34	
Less Personal Interests	 -	   0.03    0.37	
Negative Impact on Occupational Goals	 -	   0.24    0.39	
Occupational Experience	   
Instrumental Occupation	 -	   0.98*  0.41	
Model Fit	   
Wald Chi-Square	 74.49*	 103.60*	
Log Likelihood	 -186.15	 -162.66	
McFadden’s R2	 0.20	 0.30	
AIC	 380.30	 385.31	
 
 
*Significant =<0.05.  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table 3: Multinomial Logistic Model of Progressive Ambition (Base = Considered 
Standing but not acted on it) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Significant =<0.05.  
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables (Model 1 without 
controls)	
Entered 
Selection	
  β       SE	
Stood for 
Parliament	
  β        SE	
No Intention	
  of Standing	
β         SE	
Constant	 -2.20    0.61	 -1.10*  0.38	  1.33*   0.22	
Signalled/Recruited by Political 
Actors: Base = Neither	
   
Recruited by Political Actors Only	  0.81    0.76	 -0.69    0.66	 -0.50     0.33	
Signalled to Political Actors Only	  1.97*  0.72	  0.34    0.60	 -2.25*   0.53	
Both Signalled & Recruited	  1.86*  0.65	  0.58    0.45	 -3.67*   0.52	
Model Fit	    
Wald Chi-Square	 197.33*	 197.33*	 197.33*	
Log Likelihood	 -403.20	 -403.20	 -403.20	
McFadden’s R2	 0.20	 0.20	 0.20	
AIC	 830.40	 830.40	 830.40	
N	 395	 395	 395	
Variables (Model 2 with controls)	 Entered 
Selection	
   β      SE	
Stood for 
Parliament	
  β       SE	
No Intention	
  of Standing	
β       SE	
Constant	 -3.80*  1.80	 -3.79*  1.81	  1.91    1.57	
Signalled/Recruited by Political 
Actors: Base = Neither	
   
Recruited by Political Actors Only	  0.80    0.80	 -0.71    0.70	 -0.44     0.36	
Signalled to Political Actors Only	  1.92*  0.79	  0.48    0.68	 -2.61*   0.60	
Both Signalled & Recruited	  2.09*  0.71	  0.70    0.53	 -3.80*   0.57	
Model Fit	    
Wald Chi-Square	 313.78*	 313.78*	 313.78*	
Log Likelihood	 -344.97	 -344.97	 -344.97	
McFadden’s R2	 0.31	 0.31	 0.31	
AIC	 869.95	 869.95	 869.95	
N	 395	 395	 395	
	
 
Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals of Key Variables on 
Actively Seeking to Stand for Office  
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Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects of Key Variables on Progressive Ambition 
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Appendix  
 
 
Sample Information and Full Survey Item Details 
 
The total number of legislators we attempted to contact was 1849, however 45 legislators had 
either opted out of receiving surveys from the online surveying company we worked with 
(39), or had email addresses that were invalid (6). The responses by party closely matched 
partisan representation across London councils. In our sample, 48 per cent of respondents 
were Labour councillors compared to 43 per cent across London; 36 per cent of respondents 
were Conservative councillors compared to 40 per cent in London; and 13 per cent of our 
respondents were Liberal Democrat councillors which was marginally below the 15 per cent 
across London. 12 per cent of our sample identified as a member of a non-white ethnic group 
compared to 16 per cent overall across London. 41 per cent of our sample are women 
compared to 36 per cent of all London councillors. 
 
To construct our dependent variable, we asked participants: 'Have you ever considered 
standing as Parliamentary candidate (MP)?' There were three responses offered: 'Not 
considered standing', 'Have considered it but not acted on it', 'Have entered a selection 
process or otherwise made efforts to run for parliamentary candidacy'. This reflects existing 
accounts of political ambition which acknowledge that it moves in stages (Lawless and Fox 
2010). We used the following questions to derive the signaller and recruitment by political 
actor variables. 1) Have you ever approached a local councillor/local party organizer/trade 
union official/someone who works for a think tank/MP/in the Head office of your party/a 
SpAd/MP/Cabinet Minister about the possibility of you becoming a Parliamentary candidate; 
2) Has any local councillor/local party organizer/trade union official/someone who works for 
a think tank/MP/in the Head office of your party/a SpAd/MP/Cabinet Minister approached 
you and asked you to consider becoming a Parliamentary candidate.  
	
Our measure of the Big Five personality traits directly replicates the measure used by 
Dietrich et al. 2012. Respondents are asked 'To what extent do you agree or disagree that the 
following terms apply to you?' ‘Open-minded, has an active imagination'; 'Tidy and well-
organised, highly conscientious'; 'Extraverted, outgoing, and sociable'; 'Agreeable, generally 
trusting'; 'Emotionally stable, relaxes and handles stress well'. Respondents were asked to 
locate their response on a four-point Likert scale comprising 'Strongly disagree', 'disagree', 
'agree', 'strongly agree'. 
 
 
Table A1: Multinomial Logistic Model of Progressive Ambition with Controls (Base = 
Considered Standing but not acted on it) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables (Model 2 with controls)	 Entered 
Selection	
   β      SE	
Stood for 
Parliament	
  β       SE	
No Intention	
  of Standing	
β       SE	
Constant	 -3.80*  1.80	 -3.79*  1.81	  1.91    1.57	
Signalled/Recruited by Political 
Actors: Base = Neither	
   
Recruited by Political Actors Only	  0.80    0.80	 -0.71    0.70	 -0.44     0.36	
Signalled to Political Actors Only	  1.92*  0.79	  0.48    0.68	 -2.61*   0.60	
Both Signalled & Recruited	  2.09*  0.71	  0.70    0.53	 -3.80*   0.57	
Socio-Economic Variables	    
Female	 -0.37    0.48	 -1.13*  0.38	  1.02*    0.37	
Degree	  1.18*  0.58	  1.15    0.59	 -0.55      0.42	
Non-White	  1.01    0.55	 -0.30    0.69	  0.03      0.51	
Age: Base = Age 40-59	    
Age Under 40	 -1.42*  0.56	 -1.08    0.55	 -0.45      0.50	
Age 60 plus	 -0.04    0.49	  0.02    0.51	  0.48      0.39	
Missing Age	  0.19    1.02	  0.65    0.95	  0.64      0.88	
Family Structures/Roles	    
Married	 -0.64    0.62	  0.34    0.68	 -0.33      0.56	
Dependent Children	 -0.09    0.37	  0.27    0.36	 -0.28      0.35	
Responsibility for Household 
Tasks: Base = Councillor	
   
Spouse Responsible for a majority	 -0.03    0.63	  1.11    0.69	 -0.97      0.60	
Evenly Responsible for a majority 	 -0.98    0.59	  0.50    0.57	 -0.45      0.48	
Live Alone	 -1.19    0.73	  0.72    0.84	 -0.68      0.68	
Personality Traits	    
Open-Minded	 -0.14    0.27	 -0.01    0.27	  0.14      0.24	
Conscientious	  0.15    0.19	  0.12    0.20	  0.00      0.17	
Extraverted	 -0.14    0.19	  0.05    0.20	  0.11      0.16	
Agreeable	  0.25    0.29	 -0.52    0.27	  0.02      0.23	
Emotionally Stable	  0.12    0.24	  0.60*  0.25	 -0.23      0.21	
Political Socialisation	    
Talk Politics at Home	  0.54    0.45	 -0.08    0.44	 -0.09      0.36	
Parent/Family involved in Politics: 
Base = Not Involved	
   
Parent/Family Party Member Only	  0.53    0.48	 -0.07    0.53	  0.79      0.42	
Parent/Family Elected Office Only	 -0.12    0.81	  0.07    0.82	  0.25      0.61	
Parent/Family Both Member & 
Elected	
-0.26    0.62	  0.30    0.58	 -0.29      0.54	
Barriers to Running For Office: 
Base = Negative Perception	
   
Spending less time with 
family/friends	
 0.12     0.48	  0.23    0.48	  0.51      0.38	
Loss of Privacy/Media Intrusion	  0.58     0.46	  0.01    0.47	  0.24     0.39	
Less Personal Interests	 -0.26    0.52	  0.63    0.53	  0.42     0.41	
Negative Impact on Occupational 
Goals	
 0.18     0.47	 -0.19    0.50	 -0.77     0.39	
Occupational Experience	    
Instrumental Occupation	  0.77     0.50	  0.96    0.50	 -0.28     0.45	
Model Fit	    
Wald Chi-Square	 313.78*	 313.78*	 313.78*	
Log Likelihood	 -344.97	 -344.97	 -344.97	
McFadden’s R2	 0.31	 0.31	 0.31	
AIC	 869.95	 869.95	 869.95	
 
 
Table A2: Average Marginal Effects (including SEs and CIs) of Progressive Ambition - 
Significant Variables only from Table 3 Model 2 (Multinomial Logit)  
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Bold = significant at <0.05 
	
Variables	 Not Considering	
 dydx    SE        95% CIs	
Considered Standing	
dydx    SE       95% CIs	
Female	  0.16    0.04     0.08   0.24	 -0.02     0.05     -0.12  0.07	
Signalled to Political 	
Actors Only	
-0.37    0.06   -0.49  -0.25	  0.11     0.08     -0.04  0.26	
Both Signalled 	
& Recruited	
-0.53   0.05   -0.62  -0.43	  0.19     0.06     0.08   0.31	
Degree	 -0.12   0.05   -0.21  -0.02	 -0.06     0.06     -0.17  0.06	
Emotionally Stable	 -0.04   0.02   -0.09   0.00	 -0.01     0.03     -0.07  0.04	
Age Under 40	 -0.01   0.06   -0.12   0.11	  0.15      0.06      0.03  0.27	
Variables	 Entering Selection	
dydx    SE        95% CIs	
Stood for Parliament	
dydx    SE        95% CIs	
Female	 -0.02    0.04    -0.10  0.06	 -0.11    0.04    -0.19  -0.04	
Signalled to Political 	
Actors Only	
 0.21    0.07     0.09   0.35	  0.05    0.05    -0.06    0.15	
Both Signalled 	
& Recruited	
 0.25    0.06     0.14   0.36	  0.09    0.04     0.01   0.16	
Degree	  0.09   0.05    -0.01   0.19	  0.08    0.05     -0.01   0.18	
Emotionally Stable	 -0.00   0.02    -0.04   0.04	  0.05    0.02      0.01   0.10	
Age Under 40	 -0.10   0.05    -0.19   0.00	 -0.05    0.05     -0.14   0.04	
	
